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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-3806 
___________ 
 
DWAYNE BRISCOE, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                     Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A044 138 525) 
Immigration Judge:  John B. Carle 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 5, 2018 
 
Before:  JORDAN, RESTREPO and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  October 18, 2018) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Dwayne Briscoe petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”), which affirmed an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) determination that he 
was removable for a controlled substance violation, but which vacated the IJ’s decision 
granting Briscoe cancellation of removal.  We will deny the petition for review. 
I. 
 Briscoe, a citizen of Jamaica, entered the United States in 1993 as an immigrant at 
the age of seven.  In 2007, he pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled dangerous 
substance (marijuana) with the intent to distribute within 1000 feet of school property, in 
violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-7.  He was sentenced to one day in prison and three 
years’ probation.  He also was arrested in October 2015 on a domestic violence call.  In 
connection with that call, Briscoe’s girlfriend, with whom he has two U.S.-citizen 
children, stated that Briscoe had threatened her.  Briscoe had a knife in his hands when 
police arrived, although he stated that he had taken it away from his girlfriend.  His 
girlfriend declined to testify against him and bailed him out, and the charges were 
dropped.  Briscoe was placed in removal proceedings in 2016 with charges under 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (alien convicted of aggravated felony) and 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (alien convicted of controlled substance offense).  IJ Kuyomars Q. 
Golparvar sustained the charges and pretermitted Briscoe’s application for cancellation of 
removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), due to his aggravated felony finding.  On appeal, the 
BIA, citing Chang-Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 659 F. App’x 114 (3d Cir. 2016) (not 
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precedential), held that the drug conviction was not an aggravated felony, and remanded 
to the IJ for consideration of cancellation of removal. 
 On remand, IJ John B. Carle granted cancellation of removal, but the Government 
appealed, and the BIA vacated the IJ’s decision, concluding that Briscoe had “not met his 
burden of establishing that a grant of cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of 
the Act [8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)] is warranted in the exercise of discretion.”  Briscoe, 
proceeding pro se, filed a timely petition for review. 
II. 
 First, we address Briscoe’s argument that he is not removable.  He argues here, as 
he did before the IJ, that his conviction involved less than 2 grams of marijuana, and that 
such a crime is not punishable under the Federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”).  
But whether such an offense is punishable under the CSA is not relevant for purposes of 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)—that provision renders an alien removable if he “has been 
convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a 
foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21),1 
other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of 
marijuana.”  (emphasis added).  And even assuming that he possessed less than 30 grams 
of marijuana, he pleaded guilty to possession with the intent to distribute within 1000 feet 
                                              
1 Marijuana is a “controlled substance” under the CSA.  “There is no question that it is a 
federal crime to ‘possess with intent to . . . distribute . . . a controlled substance,’ 21 
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), one of which is marijuana, § 812(c).”  Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 
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of school property, which is not a conviction for possession for one’s own use.  A.R. 423-
24 (criminal judgment, indicating statute of conviction: “2C:35-7” and “Name of Drugs 
Involved Marijuana”).  Further, Briscoe is incorrect that a conviction needs to be a felony 
to be a controlled substance violation under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  See Moncrieffe, 
569 U.S. at 204 (“Any marijuana distribution offense, even a misdemeanor, will still 
render a noncitizen deportable as a controlled substances offender.”). 
 Second, Briscoe challenges the BIA’s decision to overturn the cancellation of 
removal decision.  Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), we lack jurisdiction to review 
discretionary decisions, such as “the granting of relief under . . . 1229b.”  But 
§ 1252(a)(2)(D) restores our jurisdiction to review legal claims, such as whether the BIA 
used the correct legal standard.  See Roye v. Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 
2012). 
 Briscoe argues that the BIA used the wrong legal standard because it did not defer 
to the IJ’s factual findings.  We disagree.  In its December 13, 2017 decision, the BIA 
recognized that it was to review the IJ’s factual findings under a “clearly erroneous” 
standard and it determined that the IJ’s findings were “not clearly erroneous.”  BIA’s 
decision at 1.  However, it did assign different weight to some of the factors involved in 
the decision.  For example, although the IJ noted that Briscoe “continued to smoke 
marijuana up until just prior to going into ICE detention” and expressed “concern[]” 
                                                                                                                                                  
184, 192 (2013). 
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about whether Briscoe “will continue to use illegal drugs in the United States,” the IJ 
determined that Briscoe demonstrated that he warranted relief.  IJ’s decision at 8, 13-14.2  
In contrast, the BIA stated that because Briscoe had resumed use of marijuana after 
completing his probationary period following his 2007 conviction, his testimony that he 
would not use illegal drugs in the future was “insufficient to establish that he will not 
again use marijuana, and overall, indicates a propensity to violate the law.”  BIA decision 
at 2.  Although Briscoe characterizes this as a reversal of the IJ’s factual finding, the BIA 
simply gave more adverse weight to the same factual situation, which it is authorized to 
do.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (explaining that the BIA exercises de novo review 
over discretionary questions).  
 Similarly, with regards to the domestic violence arrest, the BIA weighed the 
importance of the incident differently.  The IJ appeared to minimize the significance of 
the arrest, noting that Briscoe and his girlfriend had lived together for four years, that 
they had two children together, and that the charges were dismissed by the court.  The IJ 
also noted that Briscoe had plans to live with his mother, get a job, and provide for his 
family if released.  But the BIA, considering the same factual incident, found the arrest a 
“serious adverse factor,” as it was authorized to do.   
 Briscoe also argues that the BIA improperly characterized his drug conviction as 
“serious.”  While a conviction must be an aggravated felony in order to be a “particularly 
                                              
2 Notably, the IJ did not explicitly find that Briscoe would not use illegal drugs in the 
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serious crime,” (which, e.g., can serve as a bar to asylum relief and withholding of 
removal, see, e.g., Alaka v. Att’y Gen., 456 F.3d 88, 105 (3d Cir. 2006)), the BIA here 
did not find that it was a “particularly serious crime” under a statutory provision; rather, it 
simply characterized the crime as “serious” in the layman’s sense of the word.  Again, the 
BIA was simply assigning more weight to the undisputed fact that Briscoe had been 
convicted of a drug distribution offense. 
  Finally, Briscoe argues that the BIA failed to follow its precedent by failing to 
give any weight to the positive factors in its decision, citing In Re Arreguin De 
Rodriguez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 38 (BIA 1995).  In that case, the BIA reversed an IJ’s denial 
of relief under former § 212(c) of the Act, even though the alien had been convicted of a 
crime involving “78.45 kilograms of marijuana,” because of the alien’s substantial 
equities.  Id. at 39-41.  But the BIA did acknowledge the positive factors in Briscoe’s 
case.  See BIA decision at 1 (“[W]e agree with the [IJ] that [Briscoe] has demonstrated 
numerous equities, including [his] long residence in the United States, his strong family 
ties, and his employment history.”).  And Briscoe’s argument that the BIA “incorrectly 
weighed the evidence,” Pet. Br. at 15, is one that this Court cannot review.  See Cospito 
v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2008) (ruling that a court cannot review an 
alien’s contentions that the IJ “gave short shrift to crucial evidence” as that is simply a 
quarrel over the exercise of discretion). 
                                                                                                                                                  
future. 
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 As we discern no reviewable error in the BIA’s decision, we will deny the petition 
for review. 
 
 
